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Abstract
A durable good monopolist sells its branded product over two periods. In period 2,
when there is entry of a counterfeiter, the branded firm may charge a high price to signal
its quality. Counterfeit competition thus enables the branded firm to commit to high
future price in period 2, alleviating the classic time-inconsistency problem under durable
good monopoly. This can increase the branded firm’s profit by encouraging consumer
purchase without delay, despite the revenue loss to the counterfeiter. Total welfare can
also increase, because early purchase eliminates delay cost and consumers enjoy the good
for both periods.
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1 Introduction
Today, counterfeit has became a fast growing multi-hundred billion dollars business. In the
2007 OECD counterfeit report, the volume of counterfeits was around 200 billion dollars in
international trade, 2% of world trade.? This figure does not include domestic consumption
of counterfeits or digital products distributed via internet. The U.S. government estimated
that counterfeit trade increased more than 17 folds in the past decade (U.S. Customs and
Border Protection 2008).
Counterfeits are generally viewed as harmful to both the authentic producers and con-
sumers, especially when they are deceptive, such as counterfeits of pharmaceutical products,
eyeglasses, luxury goods or even normal textile products manufactured by famous brands.?
There have been, however, some recent empirical evidences suggesting that (deceptive)
counterfeit could actually benefit the branded firm. In particular, Qian (2008) finds that
the average profit for branded shoes in China is higher after the entry of counterfeit. Qian
(2011) shows that the impact of counterfeits on profit depends on the quality gap between
authentic good and counterfeit good; the branded firm benefits from the counterfeit when
the quality gap is sufficiently large. In this paper, I show that a branded firm can indeed
benefit from competition of a deceptive counterfeiter when their quality difference is large
enough.
I consider a model with an authentic durable-good firm who sells in two periods. With-
out counterfeits, the branded durable good monopolist faces the classic time-inconsistency
problem (Coase, 1972): After selling to high-value consumers in the first period at a high
?The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/38707619.
pdf
?This does not mean consumers can not distinguish the product at all. It is just hard for buyers to tell
without any other information. For example, a consumer may not be able to tell a genuine Chanel bag
from a fake one only by appearance. However, if one is priced at $3,000 and the other is sold for $50, she
will know that the expensive one is more likely to be authentic ex post. On the other hand, non-deceptive
counterfeits are those that consumers can easily recognize when purchasing, such as many digital products.
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price, it cannot resist cutting its price in the second period. But then rational consumers
will delay their purchase, forcing the monopolist to reduce its price in the first period
and lower the monopolist’s overall profit. Now suppose that a counterfeiter will enter the
market. In order to separate its product from the counterfeit, the branded firm needs to
set a high price to signal its quality in period 2. Thus the presence of the counterfeit
enables the branded firm to commit to a high price in period 2, providing a solution to the
time-inconsistency problem. This then motivates more consumers to purchase in period
1 instead of waiting to buy in period 2, even if the first period’s price is high. When
the quality gap is sufficiently large, this front loading effect will dominate the profit loss
from competition in the second period. In terms of total welfare, counterfeits are likely to
decrease surplus in the second period. However, first period welfare increases due to front
loaded purchases. Early purchase contributes twice surplus compared to late one because
consumers can use the good for two periods. Therefore, if the quality gap is not too large,
total welfare will be elevated by counterfeits.
The results in this paper shed some light on the policy towards counterfeits. Both
branded firms and consumers respond to counterfeits strategically. In the present paper,
the authentic firm signals itself from the counterfeiter through high price when the quality
gap is large enough. Therefore, consumers will not be fooled by counterfeits with extremely
low quality and consumer confusion may not as severe as we think. Besides, with awareness
of the entry of counterfeits, consumers are more inclined to purchase early, which benefits
both the authentic firm and total welfare in a dynamic context.
Many papers have investigated strategies the durable good monopolist can use to resolve
the commitment problem (see, e.g., Waldman, 2003 for an excellent survey). Solutions
include leasing rather than selling the durable good (Coase, 1972; Bulow, 1982), special
contract between the monopoly and consumers (Butz, 1990), offering an inferior version
(Karp and Perloff, 1996; Hahn, 2006) and product-line management (Huhn and Padilla,
1996). All of them involves tactics that the monopoly is willing to adopt to alleviate
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the problem. The present paper suggests a novel commitment mechanism through the
competition from another firm.
Several other papers have discussed the counter-intuitive result of price or profit in-
creasing competition (e.g., Chen and Riordan, 2008; Gaibaix et al., 2005; Perloff et al.,
2005; Thomadsen, 2007, 2012). In those papers, the competition changes the demand
curve of the incumbent firm. When the competitor attracts some price elastic consumers,
the incumbent can concentrate on price insensitive consumers with higher price. However,
in my paper, the higher price is created by quality signaling. In addition, in these static
models, competition generally will not increase a firm’s profit even if prices go up, because
the monopolist always earns higher profit than a duopoly if price is the same. Since the
monopoly price is the first best for an incumbent, it cannot get higher payoff at any other
price, even if that price is higher than the monopoly price. However, in a dynamic model,
the monopoly profit is not the first best. Price increasing competition helps the monopoly
to overcome time-inconsistency problem and eventually drives up profit.
While many papers have discussed counterfeit or piracy issues, most of them are about
the non-deceptive piracy of digital products (see, e.g., Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006 for a
suvery). In terms of deceptive counterfeits, Grossman and Shapiro (1988a) discuss the
problem in international trade. They show counterfeits will decrease the total welfare and
the authentic firm’s profit without the consideration of innovation. Qian (2012) focuses
on the brand-protection strategies against counterfeits, including price, quality upgrade,
etc. She uses a vertical differentiation model similar to my second period competition.
The difference is that I investigate the counterfeit problem in a dynamic context. The new
feature yields entirely opposite results. In her paper, the authentic firm’s profit decreases
with the threat of counterfeits. Total welfare also drops when the ratio of uninformed
consumer is high. However, in the present paper, the brand firm’s profit and total surplus
might increase even if all consumers are uninformed.
Finally, the second period counterfeit competition is related to the literature of duopoly
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signaling game. Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001), Fluet and Garella (2002) and Yehezkel
(2008) study the similar game with advertising. These papers focus on the role of dissipative
advertising on expanding the separating equilibrium regime while I try to answer how
counterfeits influence profit and welfare. As Qian (2012), those papers only investigate the
static game while my paper incorporates the signaling game into a durable good model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and reviews the
monopoly benchmark. Section 3 investigates the effect of counterfeit competition on profit
and welfare in a specific equilibrium. Section 4 checks the robustness of results. Section 5
concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model and Monopoly Benchmark
I adapt the two-period durable good model in Tirole (1988). A branded firm sells a durable
good that can be used in two periods. The branded firm’s quality QA is normalized to 1.
In the second period, a counterfeit firm producing a lower quality clone QC = C < 1 will
enter and compete with the branded firm.? Both firms have no marginal cost to produce
the good. Consumers know the quality of both products from the beginning of the game.?
However, they are not able to tell which good is produced by the brand firm only by
appearance when they purchase.? This contrasts the standard assumption that consumers
can trace the producer of the good, which is the problem of deceptive counterfeit. The
online market is a typical example with this feature. The authentic firm sells through
many retailers in each period. It is too costly for a consumer to track every retailer. After
?It implicitly assumes that the authentic product has some lead time advantage. Many firms would
have special designs on their new product so that imitators have to spend more time to produce the similar
counterfeit.
?They are aware of the quality of counterfeit product at the first period.
?The underling assumption is that the counterfeit is deceptive and all consumers are uninformed. An
alternative assumption is that part of consumers are informed. As long as the proportion of uninformed
consumers are large enough, my qualitative conclusion will hold.
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a while, the counterfeiter builds its own website and sell the fake good. Inexperienced
consumers can not tell whether a website has been selling the genuine product from the
first period or just enters to sell counterfeit. Besides, it is also possible that a website that
sells authentic version turns to spread counterfeits later.
There is a unit mass of heterogeneous consumer indexed by the taste parameter θl ∼
U [0, 1]. Consumer’s utility is defined as the linear function form:
Ul = θlQi − Pi, i ∈ {Authentic(A),Counterfeit(C)}
Consumer decides whether to buy in each period. The discount factor of both firms and
consumers are assumed to be 1.
Before analyzing the model, it is important to specify consumer’s belief. Let µi(PA, PC)
be the probability that consumers believe the good she purchased from firm i is the authen-
tic good given the branded firm’s price is PA and the counterfeiter’s price is PC . Unlike the
traditional monopoly signaling model, there are two signal senders here. Consumer belief
is based on price and the number of firms charge that price. Consumers are aware that
two firms sell the good and one of them is the counterfeiter. µA(PA, PC) +µC(PA, PC) = 1
must be satisfied in equilibrium. When PA = PC , consumers can not identify two products
and µA = µC =
1
2 . In the separating equilibrium, when PA 6= PC , consumers believe that
the expensive good is authentic and the cheap one is counterfeit.
Given consumer’s belief, firm’s profit is represented by Πkit(PA, PC , µi), t ∈ {1, 2}, k ∈
{Pooling Equilibrium(PE), Separating Equilibrium(SE)}, where the subscript i, t stands
for firm type and time respectively, the superscript k denotes equilibrium type in the second
period. The variables with superscript k are in equilibrium value. This notation form also
applies to other variables like price, surplus etc. Note that for both belief and profit, the
first position in parentheses is always the authentic firm’s price and the second one is the
counterfeiter’s price. Assuming the authentic firm chooses separating equilibrium when
profits are the same over two types of equilibriums.
The time-line of the game is as follows: The authentic firm sets the first period price P1
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at t=1. Consumers decide whether to buy or wait. The counterfeiter enters in the second
period and both firms set price simultaneously. Then consumers are aware of both prices
and make a purchasing decision based on their beliefs.
Before analyzing the game with counterfeit competition, let’s firstly review the bench-
mark monopoly model without entry. Initially proposed by Coase (1972), then formalized
by Bulow (1982), it is well-known that the monopoly faces a time-inconsistency problem
(Coase Conjecture) if it cannot make a commitment on future price. In the first period, the
monopoly sells to consumers with high valuation at a high price. Low valuation consumers
will be left to the second period. However, the monopoly fails to take first period’s de-
mand into account and has an incentive to decrease the price to reap the residual demand
in the second period. As a consequence, high valuation consumers will anticipate the price
reduction in the future and some of them postpone purchase to the second period. The
monopoly’s profit under intertemporal price discrimination is lower than if it can commit.
The argument can be proved as follows.?
(1) When the monopoly lacks commitment power. P2 =
1
2θ1
Consumers who purchase in the first period must satisfy the intertemporal incentive
compatibility constraint such that their first period surplus is higher.
2θ1 − P1 ≥ θ1 − P2
The marginal consumer θM1 purchases in the first period is the one makes the constraint
binding.
Then the monopoly’s aggregate profit will be determined by:
Π = (2θ1 − θ1 + P2)(1− θ1) + P2(θ1 − P2)
The marginal buyer and the monopoly’s profit are θM1 =
3
5 and Π
M = 920 respectively.
?Since there is only one firm here, the subscript represents time and the superscript stands for the
equilibrium value in monopoly case.
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(2) When the monopoly can commit to none intertemporal price discrimination:
Π = 2θ(1− θ)
This gives a profit ΠM = 12 >
9
20 and θ1 =
1
2
3 Equilibrium Analysis With Counterfeit Competition
In this section, I will firstly characterize all Perfect Bayesian Equilibriums (PBE) and then
show that there exists a reasonable equilibrium such that the counterfeit could increase the
authentic firm’s profit and social welfare.
The standard backward induction is applied to analyze the counterfeit game. As in the
benchmark, there is a marginal consumer θ1, such that all consumers with taste parameter
above θ1 will purchase in the first period. The rest consumers are left to be served in the
future. θ1 can be interpreted as the market size of the second period.
3.1 Signaling Game in Second Period
In t=2, there is a signaling game played between a pair of vertically differentiated duopoly
and consumers. Consumers use market prices to construct their beliefs. If both firms
have the same price, counterfeits are indistinguishable ex post and pooling equilibrium is
sustained. If the counterfeiter sets a lower price than the branded firm and reveals itself,
there will be a separating equilibrium where consumers know for sure which goods are
counterfeits.
In a pooling equilibrium, assume consumers randomly pick a product and the expected
quality of the product is 1+C2 . The profit function is given by the following equation.
ΠA2 = ΠC2 =
1
2
(θ1 − 2P2
1 + C
)P2
In a separating equilibrium, profit functions of both firms are the same as vertical price
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competition with complete information.
ΠA2(PA2, PC2, 1) = (θ1 − PA2 − PC2
1− C )PA2
ΠC2(PA2, PC2, 0) = (
PA2 − PC2
1− C −
PC2
C
)PC2
The counterfeiter’s best response function is always PC2 =
C
2 PA2 in the separating
equilibrium.
The key question is when the separating equilibrium can be sustained. In the standard
monopoly signaling game, the separation is attained if the single cross condition is satisfied.
The firm with high marginal cost is willing to distort price further than the low cost firm
because the profit only depends on own price and consumer belief. However, in a duopoly
case, a firm’s profit is also affected by the other firm’s price. When one sets a high price,
the other one faces a trade off between consumer belief and demand: If the counterfeiter
decides to pool with the authentic firm, it is believed to produce authentic goods at 50%
but sells less because of high price. The counterfeiter can reveal itself by a lower price,
which may be better because the upward distorted price of the branded firm mitigates
competition and leaves a large market for the counterfeiter. Two incentive compatibility
constraints must be satisfied to support a separating equilibrium. The first equation assures
that the counterfeiter does not deviate to the authentic price and the second one implies
the branded firm do want to maintain the high price. Otherwise, pooling equilibrium is
the only candidate in the second period.
ΠC2(PA2, PC2, 0) ≥ ΠC2(PA2, PA2, 1
2
) (1)
ΠA2(PA2, PC2, 1) ≥ ΠA2(PC2, PC2, 1
2
) (2)
Lemma 1. When the quality of counterfeit is low (C ≤ C1 ≈ 0.604), a set of separating
equilibriums can be sustained. PSEA2 ∈ SSE = [P2(θ1, C), P2(θ1, C)],
P2(θ1, C) =
2(1−C2)
C2−3C+4θ1, P2(θ1, C) =
(4−C)(1−C2)
2(2−C)(1+C)−C2(1−C)θ1, P
SE
C2 =
C
2 P
SE
A2 . For any
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quality C, there exists a set of pooling equilibriums.
PPEA2 = P
PE
C2 = P
PE
2 ∈ SPE = [0, P2(θ1, C)).
All equilibriums listed in Lemma 1 can be supported by a system of out of equilibrium
beliefs, such as the most pessimistic belief. For any separating equilibrium with P˜A2 ∈
[P2, P2] and P˜C2 =
C
2 PA2, if the out of equilibrium belief is that any deviating price
P
′ 6= {P˜A2, P˜C2} is conceived as a sign of counterfeits, then no firm would deviate and
that particular separating equilibrium is stable. Similarly, the belief that µ(P
′
, P˜2) = 0,
∀P ′ 6= P˜2 can support all pooling equilibriums.
This lemma is the non-advertising result in Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001). In that
paper, the use of dissipative advertising by the authentic firm serves as an extra tool to
signal its quality and could expand the separating equilibrium to the entire range. However,
in the context of counterfeit, it is hard for the branded firm to effectively advertise because
consumers can not track the firm or tell which one is burning money.
The result is very intuitive: When the quality gap is large, the profit from pooling
equilibrium is low because of the low expected quality. The authentic firm just needs to
slightly distort the price upward, which will reduce the price competition and leave the
counterfeiter enough profit under separating regime. For the branded firm, since price
distortion is moderate, the cost of signaling is not too high to them to afford. However,
if two products are close substitutes, the cost of signaling for the branded firm is so high
that it would rather pool with the counterfeiter.
As in other signaling games, there is multiple-equilibrium problem in this model as
well. In some low price pooling equilibriums, counterfeit competition is detrimental to the
branded firm’s profit. In this section, I will show that there exist an equilibrium in which
both the authentic firm and the society benefit from counterfeit under certain conditions. In
the next section, it is proved that all equilibriums surviving from the Competitive Intuitive
Criterion refinement have similar properties.
The equilibrium selected here is the one with the highest second period profit for au-
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thentic firm, which is defined as profit maximizing equilibrium. Assuming that consumers
are rational enough to figure out all equilibriums and believe that the authentic firm will
choose the price that maximizes its second period profit.? Therefore, consumers believe
the firm charging that price is the authentic firm. If both firms set that price, the good
has 50% probability to be genuine. Any good with other price is conceived as fake. This
is the pessimistic belief that supports profit maximizing price in t=2. Formally, consumer
belief is defined as follow.
µA(P
∗
A2, P2) = 1, ∀P2 6= P ∗A2;µC(P2, P ∗A2) = 1,∀P2 6= P ∗A2
µ(P ∗A2, P
∗
A2) =
1
2
;µi(P2, P
′
2) = 0,∀P2, P
′
2 6= P ∗A2
In this section, an extra asterisk is used in superscript to denote variables in profit maxi-
mizing equilibrium. Let PSE∗A2 and P
PE∗
2 be the authentic price in the optimal separating
equilibrium and pooling equilibrium respectively. P ∗A2 = Max[P
SE∗
A2 , P
PE∗
2 ] is the price
that maximizes the branded firm’s second period profit, which is illustrated in the follow-
ing lemma.
Lemma 2. In profit maximizing equilibrium, if the counterfeit’s quality is low enough
(C ≤ C3 ≈ 0.512), the separating equilibrium is supported as the PBE of signaling game
in t=2. P ∗A2 = P
SE∗
A2 = P2(θ1, C), Π
∗
A2 = Π
SE∗
A2 =
4(1−C)2(1−C2)
C2−3C+4 θ
2
1. If the counterfeit’s
quality is high (C > C3), the pooling equilibrium will be selected. For
C3 < C ≤ C2 ≈ 0.702, P ∗2 = PPE∗2 = 1+C4 θ1, Π∗2 = ΠPE∗A2 = 1+C16 θ21. For C > C2,
P ∗2 = PPE∗2 = P2(θ1, C), Π∗2 = ΠPE∗A2 =
C(1+C)(1−C2)
2(C2−3C+4)2 θ
2
1.
When C ∈ [0, C3], the price has an inverted U-shape and higher than the monopoly
price in benchmark. P2(θ1, C) is the minimum price that prevents the counterfeiter from
mimicking the branded firm. The counterfeiter’s profit under pooling increases faster with
?The firm has no commitment ability. Since the first period sell is the sunk history, consumers can only
adjust their beliefs to help the authentic firm in the second period.
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C than that under separating equilibrium when C is close to 0.? Therefore, the authentic
firm is forced to increase the price in order to reduce competition and increase the competi-
tor’s profit under separating equilibrium. As C gets larger, the condition will be reversed
and the authentic firm has no need to incur a large distortion to support separating equi-
librium. When C ∈ (C3, C2], the price increases with C because of higher expected quality.
When C is close to 1, the game converges to Bertrand Competition of homogeneous good,
and the price goes down to 0.
3.2 The Dynamic Game
In this subsection, I will analyze the dynamic game and illustrate why the entry of coun-
terfeiter may generate higher profit for the incumbent. Given the second period consumer
surplus and the first period price, the marginal buyer in the first period will be determined.
The authentic firm’s decision is to choose this marginal consumer to maximize total profit.
In the monopoly benchmark, the firm can not resist the temptation to cut price, which
makes consumer surplus too high in period 2 and decreases revenue from rational high valu-
ation consumers in period 1. However, with the competition from a deceptive counterfeiter,
consumer surplus is likely to decrease in period 2, which alleviate the time-inconsistency
problem.
Pooling Equilibrium
In the first segment of pooling equilibrium (C3 < C ≤ C2), consumer surplus in period
2 decreases because the market is flooded with counterfeits. This pushes more consumers
to buy in the first period since the authentic good can be guaranteed. However, the market
price is lower than the benchmark, which makes late purchase more attractive.? Overall,
consumer surplus falls below the benchmark case and the time-inconsistency problem is
mitigated. The effect that makes consumer buy early is named as Front Loading Effect.
?When C is close to 0,
dΠPEC2
dC
= 1
(1+C)2
P 2A2 ≥ dΠ
SE
C2
dC
= 1
4(1−C)2P
2
A2.
?PPE∗2 =
1+C
4
θ1 ≤ 12θ1
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On the other hand, the counterfeit competition will decrease the branded firm’s revenue in
the second period, which I called Competition Effect. The change of the authentic firm’s
profit is determined by the magnitude of two effects.
The marginal consumer who purchases at t=1 in pooling equilibrium is determined by
the binding incentive compatibility constraint:
2θ1 − P1 = 1 + C
2
θ1 − PPE∗2
The authentic firm’s maximization problem is:
max
θ1
ΠPE∗A (θ1) = (1− θ1)(2θ1 −
1 + C
2
θ1 + P
PE∗
2 ) +
1
2
(θ1 − 2P
PE∗
2
1 + C
)PPE∗2
The marginal buyer θPE∗1 and equilibrium profit ΠPE∗A are:
θPE∗1 =

1+ 3−C
4
2(1+ 11−5C
16
)
C ∈ (C3, C2]
[ 3−C
2
+
2(1−C2)
C2−3C+4 ]
2[ 3−C
2
+
(1−C2)
C2−3C+4 +
4(1−C2)(1−C)
(C2−3C+4)2 ]
C ∈ (C2, 1)
ΠPE∗A =

(1+ 3−C
4
)2
4(1+ 11−5C
16
)
C ∈ (C3, C2]
[ 3−C
2
+
2(1−C2)
C2−3C+4 ]
2
4[ 3−C
2
+
(1−C2)
C2−3C+4 +
4(1−C2)(1−C)
(C2−3C+4)2 ]
C ∈ (C2, 1)
As Figure 1 shows, when C ∈ (C3, C2], θPE∗1 increases with C for two reasons. In-
dividual surplus in the second period increases with the quality of counterfeit and more
customers tend to wait, which decreases the wedge between P1 and θ1. On the other hand,
the branded firm balances the profit in each period to maximize total profit by properly
choosing θ1. When C increases, there is a higher second period profit. It is optimal to
leave more customers in the second period (increase second period market size).
When C ∈ (C2, 1), θPE∗1 firstly increases and then decreases in this range. When C
gets close to 1, the front loading effect disappears because P2 is close to 0. The branded
firm decreases the market size in period 2 due to fierce competition. It can be inferred that
the incumbent does not benefit from counterfeit competition in this range.
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Separating Equilibrium
In separating equilibrium, the competition effect is similar to the pooling equilibrium
but less prominent. As the high quality producer, the branded firm would earn higher
profit compared to the head-to-head competition in pooling equilibrium. The mechanism
of the front loading effect is slightly different. Consumers will not be fooled ex post but
face a super monopoly price in the second period. The binding intertemporal incentive
compatibility constraint reflects that the marginal buyer θPE1 faces two outside options in
the second period—buy the authentic good or the counterfeit.
2θ1 − P1 = max{θ1 − P2(C, θ1), Cθ1 − C
2
P2(C, θ1)}
However, the marginal consumer who is indifferent between a genuine product and a coun-
terfeit in the second period definitely has a lower taste parameter than θ1. Therefore, the
outside option must be the authentic good in intertemporal constraint. The incumbent’s
profit maximization is as follows.
max
θ1
ΠA(θ1) = (1− θ1)(θ1 + P2(C, θ1)) + ΠSE∗A2 (θ1)
In equilibrium,
θSE∗1 =
1 + 2(1−C
2)
C2−3C+4
2[1 + 2(1−C
2)(−C2+C+2)
(C2−3C+4)2 ]
ΠSE∗A =
[1 + 2(1−C
2)
C2−3C+4 ]
2
4[1 + 2(1−C
2)(−C2+C+2)
(C2−3C+4)2 ]
The left segment of lower curve in Figure 1 informs that θSE∗1 monotonically decreases
with C. As the quality gap getting closer, the branded firm’s profit in the second period
decreases. It would be better to assign less weight on the second period by decreasing θSE∗1 .
Profit Comparison
Proposition 1. In the profit maximizing equilibrium, the authentic firm’s profit will be
higher than the monopoly benchmark if the quality of counterfeit is sufficiently low
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Figure 1: Marginal Buyer at t=1
0.512 0.702 1
C
0.6
Θ1
(C < C4 ≈ 0.188). When the counterfeit’s quality is above that threshold, no matter
which equilibrium exists in the second period, the competition always decreases the
incumbent’s profit.
In the first segment of pooling equilibrium, the front loading effect gets weaker when the
quality increases (θPE∗1 increases with C) and the time-inconsistency problem is reinforced.
However, the high quality counterfeit also weakens competition effect and raises the second
period profit. In the second segment, the competition effects gets too strong and the
front loading effect disappears. When pooling equilibrium emerges in the second period,
the competition effect is too strong and always dominates the front loading effect. The
authentic firm suffers from entry of the counterfeiter.
However, as Figure 2 shows, the branded firm’s profit has an inverted-U shape and
can be higher than the monopoly benchmark. When the quality of the counterfeit is 0,
the result with counterfeit competition is the same as the monopoly benchmark. In the
first period, since the high second period price makes consumers less likely to wait, the
front loading effect will be stronger when P2(θ1, C) is high. Recall that P2(θ1, C) has an
inverted-U shape, which implies the branded firm’s profit will has the same curvature.
On the other hand, the magnitude of negative competition effect monotonically increases
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with C. Therefore, when the quality of counterfeits is low, the combination of strong
front loading effect and weak competition effect raises the branded firm’s profit above the
benchmark. As C increases, this condition will be reversed and the incumbent’s profit falls
below the monopoly case.
Figure 2: Profit Difference
0.188 0.512 0.702
C
DP
3.3 Welfare and Policy Implication
In terms of welfare, the conventional wisdom is that without the consideration of future
R&D incentive or monitoring cost, the non-deceptive counterfeit may increase welfare while
the deceptive counterfeit is more likely to have a negative effect.? In short run, the non-
deceptive counterfeit acts like a low quality competitor, which serves low-end consumers at
a low price and increases total surplus. However, the deceptive counterfeit fools consumers
to buy the low quality product at a relatively high price, which is the reason that the
trademark law is legislated to prevent consumer confusion. This paper shows that the
impact on welfare can be quite different in a dynamic context.
?Many papers studying software piracy confirm non-deceptive piracy could increase social surplus in
short term, such as Johnson (1985) and Belleflamme (2002). Grossman and Shapiro (1988a) show deceptive
counterfeits decrease welfare with free entry in trade.
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In the monopoly benchmark, total surplus is given as follows.
TSM =
∫ 1
θM1
2θdθ +
∫ θM1
θM2
θdθ
The first term represents the surplus created by first period transaction and the second
one is welfare in the second period.? Clearly, dTS
M
dθM1
< 0. It is always better to let a
consumer buy early because she could enjoy double surplus. Given the marginal buyer in
each period, TSM = 0.775.
The welfare under deceptive counterfeit competition is a piecewise function.
TS(C) =

TSSE∗(C) =
∫ 1
θSE∗1
2θdθ +
∫ θSE∗1
θ
SE∗
2
θdθ +
∫ θSE∗2
θSE∗2
Cθdθ C ≤ C3
TSPE∗(C) =
∫ 1
θPE∗1
2θdθ +
∫ θPE∗1
θPE∗2
1+C
2 θdθ C > C3
In separating equilibrium, there are two marginal consumers in the second period. θ
SE∗
2
denotes the marginal consumer who is indifferent between the genuine good and the coun-
terfeit. θSE∗2 stands for the one who is indifferent between buying the counterfeit and
buying nothing. Surplus is discounted by C if the counterfeit is purchased. In pooling
equilibrium, expected surplus is discounted by 1+C2 for all consumers because of confusion.
Comparing the welfare under two cases yields the next Proposition.
Proposition 2. The deceptive counterfeit will increase total welfare iff the quality of the
counterfeit is not too low (C ≥ C5 ≈ 0.078).
Deceptive counterfeits have two effects on welfare. Firstly, in the second period, total
surplus decreases because of competition with incomplete information, which is the typical
critic against counterfeits. However, if the first period welfare is taken into account, the
result will be quite different. As Figure 1 shows, there are always more sells in the first
period once C > 0. The front loading effect essentially decreases first period demand elas-
ticity while the competition effect forces the incumbent to reduce the market size in t=2 by
?Surplus is attributed to the trading period. First period buyer enjoys surplus in both periods but the
purchase is made at the first period, therefore all surplus belongs to the first period.
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Figure 3: Welfare Difference
0.078 0.512 0.702
C
DTS
decreasing first period price. Consumers who purchase in the first period provide “double”
contribution on surplus since they are guaranteed with high quality for two periods, which
is the reason that total welfare could be higher under bad competition.
In Figure 3, the middle segment demonstrates the welfare difference under the pooling
equilibrium with C ∈ (C3, C2]. The downward pressure on welfare decreases with quality
of the counterfeit because consumer confusion problem is alleviated. Since θPE∗1 increases
with C in this range, the positive effect also decreases with C. Overall, the social welfare
is higher for all quality levels that sustain the pooling equilibrium in the second period.
In the right segment of Figure 3, the second period price decreases with C, which implies
more trade and higher welfare.
The left segment is the welfare under separating equilibrium. In Figure 1, as the
counterfeit’s quality improves, the positive effect increases with C roughly at the same speed
(
d2θSE∗1
dC2
is close to 0). The second period welfare decreases because of upward distorted
prices. Since the second period price has an inverted-U shape, the welfare in that period
will be an U-shape curve. Combining these two effects, it is clear why total welfare also has
U-shape. When the quality of counterfeit is 0, the model coincides with the benchmark.
When C is small, unlike the pooling equilibrium, θ1 is close to the benchmark value and
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decreases slower compared to the second period welfare. Therefore, when the quality of
the counterfeit is sufficiently low, the overall welfare effect is negative.
This proposition implies that deceptive counterfeits may have a positive effect on wel-
fare in a dynamic context, which is contrary to the traditional argument. What is more
surprising is that welfare is significantly higher when counterfeits are indistinguishable ex
post. The result reminds us to think deeply in the counterfeit problem. Firstly, branded
firms actively adopt strategies against clones. Although counterfeits are deceptive ex ante,
whether they can be recognized ex post is endogenized. If the quality of clone is low,
in which case consumer confusion induced by counterfeit has a strong negative effect on
welfare, the authentic firm will signal by price and rational consumer will not be fooled. If
consumers can not distinguish the counterfeit ex post, it must be that the quality gap is
close enough. Even if consumers are diverted to the counterfeit in that case, the welfare
loss is relatively small. Secondly, consumers have rational response to the problem. In the
present paper, they are aware that surplus associate with future purchase is lowered by
the counterfeit competition. Thus, more people buy earlier, which is beneficial for both
the branded firm and welfare. However, as I point out, when the authentic firm decides
to separate itself by distorted price, the counterfeiter can also charge a higher price in the
second period. This “price collusion” created by quality signaling might decrease welfare.
4 Equilibrium Refinement and Robustness
The profit maximizing equilibrium discussed above is not selected by a well-accepted re-
finement, which might endanger its robustness. In this section, the Intuitive Criterion
(Cho and Kreps, 1987) is applied to refine equilibriums. Since there are two signal senders
here, I will use a competitive version as Bontems et al. (2005) and Yehezkel (2008) . The
refinement is not applicable to separating equilibriums because both firms’ prices are infor-
mative. The Intuitive Criterion requires the unilateral deviation. However, since the other
firm charges the equilibrium price, consumers can use that information to construct the
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out of equilibrium belief. Therefore, I can not simply assume a belief towards the deviating
firm while the other one prices at the equilibrium path.? Previous papers use the unprej-
udiced belief in Bagwell and Ramey (1991) or similar mechanism to refine equilibriums.
In this paper, the refinement regarding separating equilibriums is not an important issue.
Our general conclusion that the competition of counterfeit may increase the branded firm’s
profit and social welfare holds in all separating equilibriums.
In previous discussion, both firms are assumed to have zero marginal cost. Now, let
the authentic firm has a slightly higher marginal cost  > 0 which is arbitrarily close to 0.
This is just a tie-breaker that helps us to eliminate all pooling equilibriums. By continuity
of all functions in the paper, this modification will not alter any of my results except for
the existence of pooling equilibrium. For simplicity of mathematics and notation, I only
explicitly state this adjustment in refinement.
4.1 Refinement
Pooling Equilibrium
The basic logic of Intuitive Criterion is equilibrium dominance. It says if there exists an
out of equilibrium price such that given consumer’s best belief towards that deviation, one
type of firm would be better off (it is willing to deviate to that price given consumers believe
that it is the authentic firm) while the other type can not benefit from that deviation under
the same condition, then the equilibrium should be eliminated by this criterion.
In terms of the pooling equilibrium, the Competitive Intuitive Criterion requires that
there is no P
′
, such that
ΠA2(P
′
, PPE2 , 1) ≥ ΠA2(PPE2 , PPE2 ,
1
2
) (3)
ΠC2(P
PE
2 , P
′
, 1) < ΠC2(P
PE
2 , P
PE
2 ,
1
2
) (4)
?Bester and Demuth (2011), Bontems et.al (2006) and Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) all discuss
this issue.
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However, for every pooling equilibrium, there must exist a P
′
such that both equations
hold. The reason is similar to monopoly signaling refinement: Once the authentic firm
has a higher marginal cost , no matter how small it is, the firm will have a lower cost
to signal. Since the the profit function satisfies single cross property, I can always find an
upward distorted price such that the authentic firm is willing to deviate if it can convince
consumers of its quality while the counterfeiter would rather pool even if deviating to that
price makes people believe it produces genuine product.
Proof : Firstly, I will show ∀P ∈ [0, P2(C, θ1)), there exists a P < P ′ < P + (1− C), such
that (3) is binding.
Choosing a δ that is arbitrarily close to 0. Then ΠA2(P + δ, P, 1) > ΠA2(P, P,
1
2) and
ΠA2(P + (1− C)θ1, P, 1) = 0 < ΠA2(P, P, 12). Therefore, by the continuity of profit
function, there must exist a P < P
′
< P + (1− C) that makes
ΠA2(P
′
, P, 1) = ΠA2(P, P,
1
2).
Plug P
′
and Eq(3) into Eq(4),
ΠC2(P, P
′
, 1)−ΠC2(P, P, 1
2
)
=(θ1 − P
′ − P
1− C )P
′ − 1
2
(θ1 − 2P
1 + C
)P
=(θ1 − P
′ − P
1− C )(
P − P ′
P −  ) < 0
Hence, for every pooling equilibrium, there is a price P
′
that the authentic firm wants to
deviate and the counterfeit firm does not given consumer’s best belief. Q.E.D
Separating Equilibrium
Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) and Yehezkel (2008) use the Resistance to Equilib-
rium Defections(REDE) to select the unique and most intuitive separating equilibrium in
the duopoly signaling game, which is similar to the unprejudiced equilibrium in Bagwell
and Ramey (1991). Basically, REDE assumes that consumers can still make reasonable
induction from the equilibrium behavior of one sender even if they see out of equilibrium
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behavior from the other sender. Mathematically, if consumers observe one good is sold
at a price P˜ ∈ [P2(C, θ1), P2(C, θ1)] and the other one is priced at P ∈ [0, P2(C, θ1)) but
P 6= C2 P˜ , then they will believe the one with P˜ is genuine and the other one is counterfeit.
This gives the authentic firm an incentive to unilaterally deviate to the price that will
maximize its profit within the separating equilibrium range. The counterfeiter never devi-
ates because any deviation cannot fool consumers. Therefore, all separating equilibriums
will be eliminated except the one that yields highest second period profit for the authen-
tic firm, which is the profit maximizing equilibrium I investigate in the previous section.
However, as I prove later, the refinement of separating equilibrium is not a big problem.
All separating equilibriums have the desired property presented in the last section.
4.2 Robustness of Results
Firstly, It can be proved that the branded firm’s profit increases with the second period
price for any counterfeit’s quality in every separating equilibrium because the front loading
effect grows faster than the competition effect. In last section, the profit maximizing
equilibrium is discussed in detail, which is the one with lowest second period price among
all separating equilibriums. Since the branded firm can benefit from the entry of counterfeit
under the equilibrium with lowest second period price, the result will hold under all other
equilibriums. If the counterfeit’s quality is below C4, the authentic firm’s profit is always
higher with the presence of counterfeits, no matter which separating equilibrium emerges
in the second period.
In terms of the impact on welfare, there is not such a nice monotonicity property among
equilibriums as profit. However, it is verified that if C is higher than a threshold, the social
welfare is higher with counterfeit competition in all equilibriums. The economic intuition
is the same as the last section. All equilibriums have higher second price (more distortion)
than the one selected by benevolent consumer belief. Thus, the incumbent’s second period
profit in other equilibriums is lower than that one. When the branded firm maximizes
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the profit, it tends to reduce the weight on the second period (lower θ1). Therefore, more
consumers purchase in the first period and the welfare increases.
Proposition 3. All pooling equilibriums are eliminated by the Competitive Intuitive
Criterion. In every separating equilibrium, when C ≤ C4, the authentic firm’s profit is
higher with the competition of counterfeit. When C ≥ C6 ≈ 0.248, the social welfare is
higher with the presence of counterfeit.
4.3 Self-Provision of Damaged Good
In this paper, the entry of a low quality competitor can actually benefit the incumbent.
The downside to the brand is that it takes away part of the revenue. An interesting
question is can the branded firm overcome the competition effect by offering an inferior
version itself and earn higher profit? We do observe many examples of damaged good.
Armani has a premium ready-to-wear line marketed as Giorgio Armani, relatively cheaper
bridges as Armani Collezioni and Emporio Armani, as well as lines distributed in shopping
malls like Armani Jeans and Armani Exchange. Deneckere and McAfee (1996) analyze how
damaged good can increase profit in a static model. The trade-off is that it serves low end
market but may decrease the demand for premium version. Hahn (2006) discusses the role
of damaged good in durable good model and shows the condition of increased profit can
be relaxed because of the extra benefit that low type consumers tend to buy low quality
version earlier. This part will elaborate why self-provision of an inferior good can not help
to increase the monopoly’s profit under my set up.
Firstly, the incumbent has no incentive to provide an inferior good in the second period.
Deneckere and MacAfee (1996) points out the linear utility function fails the condition
that damaged good helps to raise profit. In my model, no matter what inferior quality the
branded firm chooses, the optimal decision is to sell zero damaged version in t=2. The
second period price and profit are the same as monopoly benchmark. Since the price is
not higher than the monopoly price, the front loading effect does not exist. Therefore, the
23
total profit can never be higher than the benchmark. If there is any fixed cost associate
with product line introduction, the profit is always lower than the monopoly case.
Secondly, damaged good introduced in the first period is not profitable as well. Al-
though this paper has the durable good context as Hahn (2006), his argument can not be
applied here because he assumes only two types of consumers but I have a continuous dis-
tribution of θ. In his paper, part of high (low) type consumers buy high (low) quality good
in each period, which changes the ratio of consumer type. Since some low types have pur-
chased damaged good in earlier period, the firm has less incentive to decrease price sharply
later, which relaxes the competition between two versions and alleviates time-inconsistency
problem. However, with continuous consumer type, it can be proved that if anyone buys
the damaged good in the first period, then all consumers with higher θ must buy a good
in that period as well. If this is violated (e.g. [θ1, 1] buy premium goods and [θ3, θ2] pur-
chase damaged version while [θ2, θ1] buy nothing in t=1), then it can be proved that no
damaged good is sold. For θ2, intertemporally, she is indifferent between buying damaged
good in t=1 and premium good in t=2, otherwise the consumer who has a slightly higher
taste θ2 +  (→0) will deviate to purchase in t=1. On the other hand, by continuity, she
is indifferent between purchasing premium version and damaged one in t=2, which is the
binding incentive compatibility constraint required to attain a separating menu. Therefore,
θ2 is indifferent between buying damaged good in t=1 and t=2. However, this is also the
intertemporal constraint for consumer θ3, which implies θ2 = θ3. Given this argument,
in t=2, the firm still faces a group of cohort truncated above and the time-inconsistency
problem remains the same. The mechanism that helps to solve Coase Conjecture in Hahn
(2006) disappears in my model and the firm would rather just offer the original version.
5 Conclusion
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that deceptive counterfeit is harmful for
the authentic firm and total welfare. Despite business stealing effect, deceptive counterfeits
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mitigate the time-inconsistency problem for the incumbent. It is demonstrated that the
effect of the counterfeit crucially depends on its quality. When the quality gap is sufficiently
small, pooling equilibrium is sustained in the second period. The front loading effect is
never strong enough to cover the loss from the competition and the authentic firm’s profit
always decreases with counterfeiter’s entry. However, if the quality gap is sufficiently large,
the low quality counterfeit only incurs a mild competition that is dominated by increased
sell in the first period. The branded firm benefits from counterfeit competition in this case.
Besides, the incumbent can not earn higher profit by offering a damaged good because the
front loading effect disappears. In terms of welfare, contrary to traditional arguments, it is
shown that in most of quality range, the deceptive counterfeit is actually beneficial to the
society due to more earlier purchases. Surprisingly, if counterfeit remains indistinguishable
ex post, total surplus will increase for sure. The result implies that the welfare effect may
not have a straightforward one-sided conclusion. The government should take both firms
and consumers rational response into account when making policies toward counterfeits.
There are several interesting directions for future research. For instance, there is no
variable controlled by the government. What if the government is another active player in
the game and could choose policy variables against counterfeits? How will that affect the
counterfeiter’s entry decision and the interplay between the authentic firm and consumers?
In this paper, only one counterfeit firm enters in the second period. However, famous brands
face many counterfeiters with different qualities in reality. Finally, I only investigate the
short term effect of the counterfeit. How will the counterfeiter affect the authentic firm’s
innovation and product upgrading decision? If that is taken into account, is the total
welfare still likely to increase?
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 To sustain a separating equilibrium, the incentive compatibility con-
straint (1) for the counterfeiter requires that:
(
PA2 − C2 PA2
1− C −
C
2 PA2
C
)
C
2
PA2 ≥ 1
2
(θ1 − 2PA2
1 + C
)PA2
PA2 ≥ 2(1− C
2)
C2 − 3C + 4θ1 = P2(θ1, C)
This equation is derived from Eq(1) by plugging the best response function of the
counterfeit. Similarly, the incentive compatibility constraint for the authentic firm requires
that:
(θ1 −
PA2 − C2 PA2
1− C )PA2 ≥
1
2
(θ1 − C
1 + C
PA2)
C
2
PA2
PA2 ≤ (4− C)(1− C
2)
2(2− C)(1 + C)− C2(1− C)θ1 = P2(θ1, C)
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Therefore, when P2(θ1, C) ≥ P2(θ1, C), a separating equilibrium exists. Otherwise,
only pooling equilibrium can be supported.
(4− C)(1− C2)
2(2− C)(1 + C)− C2(1− C)θ1 ≥
2(1− C2)
C2 − 3C + 4θ1
This implies that when C ≤ C1 ≈ 0.604, a separating equilibrium could be supported.
For pooling equilibriums, as long as Eq(1) is violated, the counterfeiter is willing to pool
with the authentic firm. Therefore, ∀C, if PPEA2 = PPEC2 = PPE2 ∈ SPE = [0, P2(C, θ1)),
pooling equilibrium can be sustained by certain out of equilibrium beliefs. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2 In separating equilibriums, it can be easily shown that all authentic
prices are higher than the unconstrained optimal price. Since the profit function is a
concave parabola, PSE∗A2 = P2(θ1, C). In any separating equilibrium, the branded firm’s
profit decreases with the quality of the counterfeit in the second period because of intensified
competition.
In pooling equilibriums, when C < C2 ≈ 0.702, the unconstrained optimal price is
always less than P2(θ1, C). Therefore, the optimal price is the unconstrained optimal,
PPE∗2 =
1+C
4 θ1. Fixing the market size, the authentic firm’s profit increases with C within
this range. That is because consumer confusion is alleviated, which enables the firm to
raise the price. However, when C > C2, the quality gap is small and the competition is
intense. The unconstrained optimal is higher than P2(θ1, C). Since the profit function is a
concave parabola as well, PPE∗2 = P2(θ1, C).
As Lemma 1 indicates, when C ≤ C1, both types of equilibriums exist and Π∗A2 =
Max {ΠSE∗A2 ,ΠPE∗A2 }. Given C1 < C2, the price of the optimal pooling equilibrium is
PPE∗2 =
1+C
4 θ1. Since
dΠSE∗A2
dC < 0 and
dΠPE∗A2
dC > 0, there is a cut-off quality C3 ≈ 0.512 such
that the optimal separating equilibrium is chosen if C ≤ C3 and the pooling equilibrium
would be selected for C3 < C ≤ C1. When the quality of the counterfeit is low, the
profit of separating equilibrium is high because of moderate distortion while the profit of
pooling equilibrium is low due to low expected quality. As the quality of the fake good
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increases, the pooling equilibrium becomes better for the branded firm. For C > C1, the
separating equilibrium can not exist and the only candidate is the pooling equilibrium.
When C1 < C ≤ C2, the equilibrium is characterized by the unconstrained optimal price.
If C > C2, the price is P2(C, θ1). Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 1
(1) When C > C3, pooling equilibrium is sustained. There are two second period prices
given different C, both of which could be written as PPE∗2 = F (C)θPE∗1 . Firstly, I will
prove ∀C ∈ (C3, 1), ∂Π
PE∗
A
∂F (C) > 0.
frac∂ΠPE∗A ∂F (C) =
(3−C2 + F (C))[(3− C)(12 − F (C)1+C ) + F (C)2 ]
4(3−C2 +
F (C)
2 +
F (C)2
1+C )
2
Since 0 < F (C) ≤ 1+C4 ,
∂ΠPE∗A
∂F (C) > 0.
Given this property, it can be shown that even using the larger second period price
PPE∗2 =
1+C
4 θ1,∀C ∈ (C3, 1), the counterfeit competition in pooling equilibrium still can
not increase the branded firm’s profit.
Using PPE∗2 =
1+C
4 , ∀C ∈ (C3, 1).
dΠPE∗A
dC
=
(1 + 3−C4 )(−2 + 35C−5364 )
(1 + 11−5C16 )
2
< 0
Therefore, ∀C ≥ C3,ΠPE∗A (C) ≤ ΠPE∗A (C3). Since ΠPE∗A (C3) < ΠM , we have ΠPE∗A (C) <
ΠM , ∀C ≥ C3.
(2) When C ≤ C3, separating equilibrium is supported in the second period. If C=0,
the model is degenerated to the monopoly benchmark. ΠM = ΠSE∗A .
Let ∆Π(C) = ΠSE∗A − ΠM , then d∆Π(C)dC |C=0 = 0.045 > 0. So there must exist some C
that is low enough such that the authentic firm’s profit would increase under the compe-
tition.
On the other hand, the only root C4 ∈ (0, 1] of ∆Π(C) = 0 is C4 ≈ 0.188. Henceforth,
∆Π(C) ≥ 0 if C ≤ C4 and vice versa. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2.
(1) In pooling equilibrium, similar to proof of Proposition 1, let PPE∗2 = F (C)θPE∗1 .
Firstly, I will show that ∂TS
PE∗(C)
∂F (C) < 0 for any C > C2.
TSPE∗(C) = (1− (θPE1 )2)−
1 + C
4
[1− 4
(1 + C)2
F (C)2]
∂TSPE∗(C)
∂F (C)
= 2(θPE∗1 )
2[
∂θPE∗1 (C)
∂F (C)
(
1 + C
4
− F (C)
2
1 + C
− 1)− F (C)
1 + C
θPE∗1 ]
Plugging in θPE∗1 and
∂θPE∗1 (C)
∂F (C) , it is easy to verify that
∂TSPE∗(C)
∂F (C) < 0.
Given this property, it is proved that with the larger second period price PPE∗2 =
1+C
4 θ1,∀C ∈ (C3, 1), the counterfeit competition with pooling equilibrium still increases
the total welfare. When PPE∗2 =
1+C
4 θ1, θ
PE∗
2 =
1
2θ
PE∗
1 .
TSPE∗(C) =
∫ 1
θPE∗1
2θdθ +
∫ θPE∗1
θPE∗2
1 + C
2
θdθ
= 1− (θPE∗1 )2(1−
3(1 + C)
16
)
∆TSPE∗(C) = TSPE∗(C)− TSM (C) = 5
8
(θM1 )
2 − (θPE∗1 )2(1−
3(1 + C)
16
)
d∆TSPE∗(C)
dC
=
8(1 + C)
(27− 5C)3 > 0
Therefore, ∆TSPE∗(C) ≥ ∆TSPE∗(C3), ∀C > C3. Since, ∆TSPE∗(C3) > 0, deceptive
counterfeit always results in a higher welfare under the pooling equilibrium.
(2) In separating equilibrium,
θ
SE∗
2 =
2− C
2(1− C)P2(C, θ1), θ
SE∗
2 =
1
2
P2(C, θ1)
TSSE∗(C) =
∫ 1
θSE∗1
2θdθ +
∫ θSE∗1
(2−C)(1+C)
C2−3C+4 θ
SE∗
1
θdθ +
∫ (2−C)(1+C)
C2−3C+4 θ
SE∗
1
1−C2
C2−3C+4 θ
SE∗
1
Cθdθ
= 1− 1
2
(θSE∗1 )
2[1 +
(1 + C)2(4− 3C)(1− C)
(C2 − 3C + 4)2 ]
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Since d∆TS
SE∗(C)
dC |C=0 < 0, if C is sufficiently low, TSSE∗(C) < TSM (C). Besides, there
is only one root C5 ∈ (0, 1] such that ∆TSSE∗(C) = 0. Therefore, ∀C ≤ C5, TSSE∗(C) ≤
TSM (C) and vice verse. Under separating equilibrium, the entry of a deceptive counterfeit
increases total welfare if the quality of the counterfeit C ≥ C5 ≈ 0.078. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
P2(C, θ1) =
2(1− C2)
C2 − 3C + 4θ1, P2(C, θ1) =
(4− C)(1− C2)
2(2− C)(1 + C)− C2(1− C)θ1
For notation convenience, let
K(C) =
2(1− C2)
C2 − 3C + 4 ,K(C) =
(4− C)(1− C2)
2(2− C)(1 + C)− C2(1− C)
Therefore, any authentic price in separating equilibrium is between K(C)θ1 and K(C)θ1.
(1) For incumbent’s profit:
ΠSEA =
1
4
[1 +K(C)]2
[1 + 2−C2(1−C)K(C)
2]
∂ΠSEA
∂K(C)
=
[1 +K(C)][1− 2−C2(1−C)K(C)]
2(1 + 2−C2(1−C)K(C)
2)2
Since 1− 2−C2(1−C)K(C) ≥ 1− 2−C2(1−C)K(C) > 0,
∂ΠSEA
∂K(C) > 0. The profit maximizing equilibrium
is the one that yields lowest total profit for the incumbent. In that equilibrium, when C ≤
C4, the profit with counterfeit is higher. Therefor no matter which separating equilibrium
is sustained in the second period, ∆ΠSEA (C) ≥ 0 if C ≤ C4.
(2) For total welfare:
∆TSSE(C,K(C)) = 0.225− 1
8
[1 +K(C)]2[1 + 4−3C4−4CK(C)
2]
[1 + 2−C2−2CK(C)
2]2
When C = 0,
∆TSSE(0,K(0)) = 0.225− 1
8
[1 +K(0)]2
1 +K(0)2
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Since [1+K(0)]
2
1+K(0)2
increases with K(0),
∆TSSE(0,K(0)) ≤ 0.225− 1
8
[1 +K(0)]2
1 +K(0)2
= 0
When C = C1, ∀K(C1),
∆TSSE(C1,K(C1)) = 0.225− 1
8
[1 +K(C1)]
2[1 + 4−3C14−4C1K(C1)
2]
[1 + 2−C12−2C1K(C1)
2]2
> 0.225− 1
8
[1 +K(C1)]
2
[1 + 2−C12−2C1K(C1)
2]
≥ 0.225− 1
8
[1 +K(C1)]
2
[1 + 2−C12−2C1K(C1)
2]
> 0
Therefor, when C = 0, the welfare differences under all equilibriums are negative.
However, when C = C1, the welfare differences under all equilibriums are strictly positive.
By continuity of the welfare difference function, there must exist a threshold C6 such that
as long as C ≥ C6, the welfare is higher with the entry of deceptive counterfeit for any
separating equilibrium. Numerically, I find that C6 ≈ 0.248. Q.E.D.
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